Email Authentication

Why Email Forwarding Breaks SPF and DMARC (and How ARC Helps)

InboxSure··7 min read

Email forwarding is when a server that received a message for one address sends it on, unchanged, to another address: an alumni alias, a .forward file, a "forward all mail to" rule or a mailing list. The message arrives at its final mailbox from a server the original sender has never heard of, and the SPF, DKIM and DMARC checks run again from scratch there. One of them breaks every time, one usually survives, and which is which decides whether your mail is delivered.

Why does SPF fail after forwarding?

SPF fails after forwarding because the forwarder sends the message from its own IP address while keeping the original envelope sender. The final receiver looks up the SPF record of the envelope sender's domain, and the forwarder's IP is not in it.

SPF checks one thing: is the connecting IP listed by the domain in the envelope sender (the Return-Path)? On the first hop the answer is yes. On the second hop the domain is the same and the IP is the forwarder's. An illustrative header written by the final receiver:

Authentication-Results: mx.google.com;
  spf=softfail (domain of transitioning news@example.com does not
    designate 198.51.100.7 as permitted sender)
    smtp.mailfrom=news@example.com;
  dkim=pass header.i=@example.com header.s=s1;
  dmarc=pass (p=REJECT) header.from=example.com

Nothing in your SPF record fixes this. You cannot list every server your recipients might forward through, and Google's best practices for forwarding email to Gmail say plainly that "forwarded messages often fail SPF authentication."

Three cards showing a sender at example.com, a forwarder at alumni.example.edu and Gmail as the final receiver, with the result that SPF fails because the forwarder's IP is not in the sender's SPF record, DKIM passes because the signature travels inside the message, and DMARC passes through DKIM
The forwarder changes the sending IP and nothing else. SPF notices; DKIM does not.

Does DKIM survive email forwarding?

DKIM survives email forwarding as long as the forwarder does not change the signed headers or the body, because the DKIM signature is a header inside the message and is verified against a public key in the sender's DNS, not against an IP address.

The sending server signs the message with a private key and the receiver fetches the public key from the sender's DNS to check the body hash and signature
DKIM verification needs only the message and the sender's DNS, so it works from any hop.

DKIM breaks when the message is edited in transit. Google's forwarding page lists the edits that do it: modifying the Subject, changing the body or re-encoding it, changing MIME boundaries, and altering signed headers such as To, Cc, Date and Message-ID. Mailing lists are the usual cause, because they add a [list-name] tag to the subject and an unsubscribe footer to the body. Security gateways that rewrite links or strip attachments do the same. Our DKIM guide covers the body hash did not verify error this produces.

What does DMARC do with a forwarded message?

DMARC passes a forwarded message if either SPF or DKIM passes with a domain that matches the From header, so a forwarded message with an intact, aligned DKIM signature passes DMARC even though SPF failed. If DKIM is missing, unaligned or broken, DMARC fails.

When DMARC fails, the receiver applies your policy: nothing at p=none, spam folder at quarantine, rejection at reject. The scenarios below assume the sender publishes a DMARC record.

ScenarioSPF at the final receiverDKIM at the final receiverDMARC result
Direct send, DKIM signed with the From domainPass, alignedPass, alignedPass
Plain forward, message unchangedFail: forwarder's IP is not in the sender's recordPass, alignedPass, through DKIM
Forward with SRS, message unchangedPass for the forwarder's domain, not alignedPass, alignedPass, through DKIM
Plain forward, sender relied on SPF aloneFailNone, or signed by another domainFail: the sender's policy applies
Mailing list adds a footer, keeps the original FromPass for the list's domain, not alignedFail: body changedFail, unless the receiver accepts the list's ARC seal
Mailing list rewrites From to its own domain and re-signsPass, aligned with the listPass, aligned with the listPass, judged against the list's domain

What is SRS (Sender Rewriting Scheme)?

SRS, the Sender Rewriting Scheme, is a way for a forwarder to replace the envelope sender with an address at its own domain, so that SPF is checked against the forwarder's SPF record and passes. A rewritten address looks like SRS0=HHH=TT=example.com=news@forwarder.example.

SRS fixes SPF and nothing else. The domain that now passes SPF is the forwarder's, not the one in your From header, so the pass is not aligned and does not count for DMARC. SRS stops receivers that reject on SPF failure alone and keeps bounces flowing back through the forwarder. Google recommends it in other words: "Change the envelope sender to reference your forwarding domain."

What is ARC in email?

ARC, the Authenticated Received Chain, is a set of three headers that a forwarder adds to record the SPF, DKIM and DMARC results it saw before passing the message on, signed so the next receiver can verify who recorded them. ARC is defined in RFC 8617, published in July 2019 with Experimental status, not as an Internet standard.

ARC does not make a failing message pass. It hands the final receiver evidence: "this passed DMARC when it reached me, and here is my signature." The receiver then decides whether it trusts that forwarder.

Three stacked cards for the headers in one ARC set: ARC-Authentication-Results copies the SPF, DKIM and DMARC results the forwarder saw, ARC-Message-Signature is a DKIM-style signature over the message as forwarded, and ARC-Seal signs the ARC headers and carries cv=none, pass or fail
Each forwarder adds one set of three headers with the same instance number.

Here is an illustrative ARC set, constructed for this article and not taken from a real message. Signatures are shortened.

ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1794552000; cv=none;
    d=forwarder.example; s=arc2026; b=Qm9nVXNTaWc...
ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed;
    d=forwarder.example; s=arc2026; t=1794552000;
    h=from:to:subject:date:message-id:dkim-signature;
    bh=47DEQpj8HBSa...; b=kT4xVm0yUGw...
ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.forwarder.example;
    spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=bounce.example.com;
    dkim=pass header.d=example.com header.s=s1;
    dmarc=pass header.from=example.com
  • i=1 is the instance number. The first forwarder writes 1, the next writes 2, up to a limit of 50.
  • ARC-Authentication-Results is the forwarder's own verdict on arrival. Here everything passed.
  • ARC-Message-Signature works like a DKIM signature over the message as the forwarder sent it, footer included. d= is the forwarder's domain.
  • ARC-Seal signs the ARC headers themselves. Its cv= tag is the chain validation status: none on the first set, because there was no earlier chain, pass when the earlier sets verified, and fail when they did not. RFC 8617 treats a failed chain the same as no chain.

Which mailbox providers evaluate ARC?

Google and Microsoft both document that they read ARC headers, as of November 2026, and neither treats an ARC pass as an automatic pass for the message.

  • Google. Google's ARC email authentication page says ARC "reduces the possibility that forwarded messages will fail email authentication." The forwarding page adds that Gmail "doesn't automatically authenticate forwarded messages that previously passed authentication" and "does its own authentication check." Google's email sender guidelines used to tell forwarding services, mailing lists and inbound gateways to "add ARC headers to outgoing email": that sentence is in the copy archived on 1 June 2025. When we read the live page on 13 November 2026 it was gone, and the page sends forwarders to the forwarding best practices.
  • Microsoft 365. Microsoft's Configure trusted ARC sealers documentation lets an admin list the d= domains of services it trusts. After that, "Microsoft 365 uses the original email authentication information that the ARC sealer provides." An override shows as arc=pass with oda=1, and compauth=pass reason=130. Microsoft notes that ARC overrides DMARC failures only, not spam filtering.

What should senders do about forwarding?

Senders should sign every message with DKIM using their own From domain, because an aligned DKIM signature is the only authentication that survives a plain forward. A sender cannot add ARC for hops that happen later, and cannot fix SPF for them.

  1. Turn on DKIM with your own domain at every service that sends as you. The free DKIM checker confirms the key is published.
  2. Keep SPF correct for direct mail with the SPF checker, and do not count on it for DMARC.
  3. Only then tighten the policy. Moving to p=reject while a mail stream passes DMARC on SPF alone means every forwarded copy of that stream is rejected. Check the published record with the DMARC checker.
The free DMARC checker showing google.com with a p=reject policy and an aggregate report address
The policy shown here is what a forwarded message without aligned DKIM is judged against.

What should forwarders and mailing lists do?

Forwarders should pass messages on without editing them, rewrite the envelope sender to their own domain, and add an ARC set. Lists that must edit the message should also rewrite the From header to the list's domain and sign with their own DKIM key.

Google's forwarding page also asks forwarders to filter spam before forwarding it, because the forwarder's IP takes the reputation hit, and to add an X-Forwarded-For: or X-Forwarded-To: header.

How do you spot forwarding in a DMARC report or in headers?

Forwarding shows in a DMARC aggregate report as a small number of messages from an IP you do not send from, with SPF failing and DKIM passing for your domain. In the headers it shows as an extra Received hop plus forwarding or ARC headers.

WhereWhat you seeWhat it means
DMARC report rowSource IP of a university, ISP or mailbox provider; spf fail, dkim passA recipient forwards their mail. No action is needed.
DMARC report rowreason type forwarded, mailing_list or local_policy with a comment starting arc=passThe receiver overrode your policy. RFC 8617 defines the ARC comment.
Return-Path headerAddress beginning SRS0=A forwarder rewrote the envelope sender.
Message headersX-Forwarded-To, X-Forwarded-For, or ARC-Seal: i=1 from a domain that is not the sender or the receiverThe message passed through that intermediary.

How to read DMARC reports covers the report fields, and how to read email headers covers the Received chain. To skip reading by hand, paste the header into the email header analyzer.

Where list quality fits

Authentication decides whether a receiver believes the message is from you. It does not decide whether the address exists. A forwarding alias that points at a dead mailbox still bounces, and the bounce comes from a server you never sent to. InboxSure checks syntax, MX records and the mailbox itself over SMTP without sending, and flags catch-all domains and role accounts. It cannot see whether an address forwards elsewhere: no verifier can, because the forwarding rule is private to the receiving server.

If forwarded bounces are showing up in your reports, clean the list before the next send. The bulk email verifier takes a CSV, and the Free plan covers lists of up to 50 addresses with no card.

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